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Abstract: This paper considers the incentives of firms to conform to an exogenous
international product standard. Product standardization enables traditional,
price-based international competition.  But the existence of redesign costs or
network effects creates market frictions that diminish the incentive to
standardize if there already exists a different technology in an established
market. This leads to multi-attribute competition between products and will
generally reduce trade flows. Not only do incumbent firms using a different
technology have an incentive to deviate from the international standard, but
a host country government that is also concerned for the welfare of consumers
who own the old technology has no incentive to enforce the international
standard.  Indeed, the government may value deviation from the international
standard more than the firm does, thereby creating incentives to adopt and
enforce technical barriers to trade. The results highlight the challenge lock-in
effects pose to the international standard-setting process.1 Network externalities may arise in the case of food safety standards because general
acceptance of the product is taken as a signal of safety and quality.  Put differently, network
externalities are analytically equivalent to bandwagon effects common in consumer psychology.
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Rational Incompatibility with International Product Standards 
"These days, it is differences in national regulations,
far more than tariffs, that put sand in the wheels of
trade between rich countries."
The Economist, 24 May 1997, p.72
I. Introduction
Technical product standards are becoming key issues, both in corporate global business
strategy and in government trade and technology policy.  Sharp long-run reduction in average tariff
levels, import quotas, and real international communications and transport costs have led to increased
international economic integration.  However, international diversity in product standards can lead
to technical barriers to trade that threaten to limit further integration (Hillman 1991, Kende 1991,
Sykes 1995, Thilmany and Barrett 1997).  Internationally accepted product standards can facilitate
international trade by reducing search and adjustment costs, cutting production costs where there are
economies of scale or scope, and facilitating spatial arbitrage.  For goods characterized by demand-
side network externalities (e.g., electrical products with voltage standards, food safety standards
1),
the incentives to achieve compatibility may be especially pronounced (Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1994).
Considerable effort is therefore being invested currently in developing international product (including
product safety) standards through intergovernmental bodies — such as the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO), Codex Alimentarius (Codex), the International Electrotecnical Comission
(IEC), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum — as well as through private
negotiation among firms. Meanwhile, trade treaties (e.g., NAFTA) increasingly incorporate language2
designed to restrict nations' abilities to introduce technical barriers to trade (Sykes 1995, Wilson
1995).
Some nations and firms nonetheless choose not to adopt international standards.  Automotive
and machinery parts come in metric and non-metric sizes, railroad tracks and machinery exist in
different gauges, fresh foods exporters use different controls against contamination (yielding
potentially different ex post risks), and so on.  Sometimes standards idiosyncratic to a particular firm
or industrial cluster become mandatory in a particular economy (e.g., righthand-side-drive vehicles,
food handling or storage practices) when governments convert voluntary standards into regulations.
This is one source of technical barriers to trade, which appear to be increasing, both relative to quotas
and tariffs and in absolute terms, as reflected in the quote that opens this paper.
This paper considers why a firm might choose not to comply with international product
standards and why its host government might not enforce the international standard, and indeed might
compel instead maintenance of a noncompliant, preexisting technology standard.  If key market
participants have incentive to maintain incompatible standards, then efforts to design uniformly
agreeable international standards may prove futile.  In this paper, we show that incentives to deviate
from international standards may be significant under plausible assumptions.  Our analytical findings
are consistent with the dominant international pattern: countries typically do not recognize
international standards.  For example, the U.S. Congressional Research Service found that only 17
of approximately 89,000 standards recognized in the United States had international origins (USHR
1989).  2 We have in mind either two-way (in)compatibility among alternative technologies or
one-way incompatibility from the original domestic technology to the two new technologies.  
3 Hillman (1991), Sykes (1995) and Thilmany and Barrett (1997) discuss the political
economy of technical barriers to trade.
4 Gandal and Shy (1996) tackle related issues.
3
The literature on networks explains incompatibility
2 as arising either from consumer
heterogeneity that gives social value to variety, from stochastic technology quality that creates
disincentives to betting everything on one standard of uncertain ultimate quality, or from firm
asymmetries that cause one firm to be confident it will win a contest of competing standards (Farrell
and Saloner 1986, Katz and Shapiro 1986, Matutes and Regibeau 1988, Katz and Shapiro 1994).
Without recourse to any of those rationales, we show that international standards incompatibility will
generally be a rational choice for firms and governments simply because product differences already
exist.  This finding obviously carries significant implications for costly expenditures on international
product standardization agreements designed to facilitate trade.  Important classes of prospective
signatories may never find it in their interest to comply with standards.  Our findings also offer some
insight as to why governments wishing to maximize social welfare might impose technical barriers
to trade.
3  As Matutes and Regibeau's (1996) recent review highlights, these international
standardization choices and policies have been largely neglected in the literature to date.
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II. International Standards and the Domestic Network Market
Products in network markets generate some of their value through compatibility with others.
Fax machines, computer software, and automobile parts are familiar examples.  The network value
of the good takes the form of an externality which is a function of the volume of the product in use,5 One example is the color television broadcasting case discussed by Pargal (1996),
wherein reception and transmission standards must be common to work.  Similarly, a nation's
vehicle manufacturers must uniformly produce either righthand- or lefthand-side drive vehicles,
not both, for local sale.  Another example is food safety, sanitary and phytosanitary standards,
which typically originate through cooperative, common definition by firms and government within
a particular jurisdiction, but which vary across jurisdictions.
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often referred to as the "installed base" of the network.  Markets in goods characterized by network
externalities are especially appropriate subjects for the study of international product standards
because product standards and resulting compatibility influence consumers' valuation of a product.
If production or exchange technologies exhibit nonconstant returns over any range, standards also
influence production and transaction costs.  Comparative advantage, international demand patterns,
and trade flows in network products are thus affected by product standards.
Sykes (1995) defines a product "standard" as a specification or set of specifications that relate
to a product's attributes. Standards commonly arise through the cooperation of firms, sometimes in
partnership with government.  There commonly develop multiple coalitions of firms, each coalition
adhering to a different product standard, but each firm within the coalition adhering to exactly the
same standard (Kindelberger 1983, Casella 1996, Economides and Flyer 1998).
5  In such cases,
competition between coalitions can be modelled as oligopolistic, the path we follow here.
Compliance with standards is voluntary and may or may not be formally promulgated by a
private or public standard-setting entity.  A coalition can redesign its technology to suit an
exogenously imposed standard or it can retain its existing technology standard. In some cases
governments wish to enforce compliance with a standard by means of regulatory controls.  When a
standard is being enforced on a national market, the government typically must emplooy technical6 For example, a software package might be able to access another application's format
although their other characteristics may be decidedly different and imperfectly compatible
(Gandal, 1995).  
7 Monopoly could be due to intellectual property rights conveyed by trademarks,
copyrights, patents, etc.  Or it could be due to brand proliferation in the face of fixed costs.
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barriers to trade in order to ensure all imported products are also fully compatible with the mandated
specifications.  Standards choices are thus one means by which technical barriers to trade arise.
This section presents a simple, two-stage model of technology choice in a market for a
product exhibiting network externalities.  We draw on the pioneering work of Katz and Shapiro
(1985), extending their approach to permit firms nondichotomous choice over standards
compatibility.  Like Jain (1989) and Shy (1996), we allow for partial compatibility in our model,
reflecting the common phenomenon that some, but not all, key features may be compatible among
products providing similar services.
6  Partially compatibile products (partly) contribute to each other's
installed network base, thereby influencing market equilibria. 
The scenario we model runs as follows.  There exist two coalitions within which firms jointly
decide on output quantities and product standards, i.e., the coalitions operate like oligopolistic cartels.
While there are fixed costs associated with supplying the market and each firm within a coalition
enjoys a monopoly in its particular brand of the standardized technology,
7 entry and exit into a
coalition are free, so a monopolistic-competition equilibrium prevails within the coalition, and in long-
run equilibrium, firms earn zero profits in spite of the oligopolistic competition between cartel-like
coalitions (Shy 1995).  Without loss of generality, assume one coalition is comprised of domestic
firms and the other of foreign firms.  6
The domestic coalition offers a product with an original technology potentially incompatible
with a subsequently chosen international technology standard belonging to the foreign coalition.  So
there may be two distinct technologies already in use when the domestic coalition makes its choice
of whether or not to comply with the international standard. The potential differences between these
two technologies are captured in a compatibility index, $, defined over the unit interval. The
international product standard is fully compatible with the original domestic technology if $=1, they
are totally incompatible if $=0, and they are partially compatible if $0(0,1).  In the case where no
prior domestic technology exists, $=1 de facto, since there is no incompatibility problem.  
The market is in equilibrium when the foreign technology, $, becomes the international
standard.  The domestic coalition responds by potentially changing its technology.  The index "0[0,1]
captures the compatibility between the coalition's new and old technologies. The domestic coalition's
new and original technologies are totally incompatible if "=0, they are perfectly compatible if "=1,
and they are partially compatible if "0(0,1). At the same time, the domestic government decides
whether to encourage or enforce either the international standard or the original domestic technology,
i.e., to impose either "=$ or "=1  by regulatory fiat. 
The timing of the game is as follows.  In the first stage, the domestic coalition chooses a
technology for its new product, i.e., decides ", given the installed base of both the original domestic
technology and the international standard, and the compatibility of the international standard with the
original domestic technology, as reflected by $.  In the second stage, consumers form expectations
about the network sizes of both technologies, given the domestic coalition's compatibility decision
in stage one.  We assume a fulfilled expectations equilibrium, following Katz and Shapiro (1985).
Finally, the domestic coalition and its foreign competitor set quantities in a Cournot competition.  We8 When established consumers can switch, the installed network base becomes endogenous
and one has to allow for prospective differences in the intrinsic value associated with the original
and new technologies, as well as for consumer switching costs.  Intuitively, when the gains from a
better or more compatible technology are sufficiently large to justify incurring switching costs,
consumers replace the old technology.  The qualitative results of our simpler model carry through
to this more refined setting, but the analysis gets messy.  In the interests of clarity, we use the
limiting assumption of no switching to simplify the model.
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find that, save for unusual circumstances, neither the domestic coalition nor the social welfare-
maximizing government have an incentive to adopt the international product standard.  This result
has obvious implications for negotiations over international product standards agreements.
A. Consumer Behavior
There are two classes of consumers in our model.  The first group are consumers who
previously purchased the original domestic technology.  There are q0 such established consumers
making up the installed base of the domestic technology.  Similarly, there are q0* established
consumers of the foreign technology.  In order to keep the analysis simple, we do not permit
established consumers to switch to the new technology.
8  Established consumers derive a discounted
stream of benefits from the product equal to k + V(N), where N is the network size.
Coalitions make profits by selling to the second class of new, prospective consumers.
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), a prospective consumer of type r has a willingness to pay
r+v(Ne) for a product with expected network size Ne ,where r represents her intrinsic valuation of the
product and v(Ne) reflects the network externality.  For simplicity, we assume r is uniformly
distributed with density one between minus infinity and A, a positive number. The network externality
function, v(.), is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, with v(0)=0,  v' > 0, v'' < 0, and
limz6œ v'(z) = 0 where there exists a large network size, œ.  We should point out that œ is not a9 More complex network effects, in which the monotonicity and concavity assumptions on
V(Ne) are relaxed, can accomodate network overload or exclusivity effects — with v'<0 at very
large or very small network sizes, respectively — but do not change the qualitative results of our
analysis.
10Consumers care about the installed base in each technology because they may wish to
network with others who purchased an earlier technology.  This is a common phenomenon in, for
example, automobiles, computer software, and facsimile machines.  An alternative interpretation,
appropriate to cases such as food safety, is that new consumers care about first generation
consumption volumes as a signal about product quality or safety.  
8
saturated market, merely one in which the marginal value to consumers of adding another user has
vanished; contemporary fax, electronic mail, road, and utility networks are examples that spring
immediately to mind.
9 The non-network services provided by the technologies are viewed as
homogenous by all consumers, but the technologies may not be perfectly compatible. The only
differences are the expectations about the sum of weighted network sizes since the networks might
not be perfectly compatible. 
Once the new domestic technology’s standard has been established and becomes known,
consumers form expectations about the weighted size of the new networks associated with the
domestic and foreign products based on the known existing network sizes of both the original
domestic technology and the international standard and on the expected sales of each, qe and qe*,
respectively.
10  The expected weighted average network size for prospective consumers of the new
domestic product is then





where f("-$) is a concave index function with support [0,1] that measures the compatibility deviation
between the new domestic technology and the international standard.  If "=$, the two new
technologies are fully compatible with each other, although they might not be fully compatible with9
the original domestic technology (if "=$￿1).  Without loss of generality, assume f'(.)>0 when "-$<0,
f("-$)=1 and f'(.)=0 when "=$, f'(.) < 0 when "-$>0, and  fO(.) < 0 for all " and $.  If "=1 consumers
fully count the installed base of the original domestic technology since the domestic original and new
technologies are fully compatible.  Simply put, the more compatible the new domestic technology is
with another product — whether the international standard or the original domestic technology —
the more weight  consumers give to the installed base of other (domestic or foreign) products in
forming their expectations of the relevant network size for the new domestic technology.  Consumers
similarly form expectations of the weighted average network size for the imported product
conforming to the international standard.
(2) N
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For network goods, compatibility creates value for consumers, whether established or prospective.
Each prospective consumer maximizes her surplus by purchasing one unit of either the new
domestic or foreign product or by declining to purchase either product.  In order to focus attention
on the decision of whether or not to conform with the international standard, we assume the foreign
coalition cannot unilaterally change its product's standard; it must satisfy the international standard.
The foreign coalition can only choose the quantity it exports into the market, q*, in order to maximize
its profits in the domestic market.  Letting p denote the price of the new domestic product, an agent
who purchases the new domestic technology must have 
(3) r % v(Ne) & p $ 0
Symmetrically, any agent who purchases the new foreign product must have
(4) r % v(N
(
e ) & p
( $ 010
Those prospective consumers whose reservation prices are less than either p or p* stay out of the
network market. Therefore, if r+v(Ne)-p > r+v(Ne*)-p* for all consumers, no one buys the imported
international standard product. Analogously, no one buys the new domestic product if  r+v(Ne)-p <
r+v(Ne*)-p* for all consumers.  Under those two limiting situations, the domestic market has a single
provider, either the domestic coalition or foreign producers.
If the domestic and international products are homogenous — i.e., " = $, whether or not "
= $ =1 — then v(Ne)=v(Ne*), so the low-price producer captures the entire market.  This is the
textbook example of price-based division of a homogenous good's market, and a special case of our
model of potentially heterogeneous (i.e., imperfectly compatible) goods.  But in the more general
case, the low price competitor does not necessarily capture the market if network effects confer an
advantage on the producer offering the good at a higher price.  In particular, the domestic coalition's
choice of technologies influences control over the market.  The next section describes the coalition's
optimal technology choice.  We will then subsequently revisit the possibility of market exclusion
conditional on the coalition's optimal technology choice.
Our interest centers on the scenario in which both the imported international standard and the
new domestic product exist in the domestic market in the second stage. In equilibrium, two coalitions
both have positive sales only if 
(5) r % v(Ne) & p ’ r % v(N
(
e ) & p
(
Equation (5) can be rearranged as follows




Equation (6) indicates that the expected hedonic prices must be equal if both coalitions have positive
sales in the competitive domestic market. Let N stand for the common value of the hedonic prices,11
i.e., N =  p - v(Ne)= p* - v(Ne*).  Only those consumers whose intrinsic valuation of the product is
greater than the hedonic price (r$N) will buy a new product. Since r is uniformly distributed between
minus infinity and A with density one, A-N consumers enter the product network. If the total sales
of the products from two coalitions are (q+q*), then
(7) A & N ’ q % q (
Substituting for N yields
(8) A & (p & v (Ne)) ’ q % q (
Rearranging equation (8), we find that the domestic coalition faces the downward-sloping inverse
demand function
p = A + v(Ne) - (q+q*) (9)
Substituting instead p* - v(Ne*) for N in (7) and rearranging yields the inverse demand function for
the imported product conforming to the international standard
p* = A + v(Ne*) - (q+q*) (10)
Coalitions make their own decisions knowing these inverse demand functions.
B. Coalition Behavior
The foreign coalition sells a product conforming to the predetermined international standard;
it has no unilateral influence to change that standard.  The foreign coalition enters the game actively
only in the second period, as a quantity-setting Cournot competitor.  The domestic coalition, on the
other hand, chooses the degree of compatibility between its new and old products, ", in the first
period, knowing the international standard ($), the installed network base under both the original12
domestic and the international standard technologies (q0 and q0
*, respectively), and the way in which
consumers form expectations. 
The domestic coalition offers an upgraded product in response to market entry by foreign
coalitions selling the international standard only if total revenue is larger than the sum of variable,
redesign  and other fixed costs.  The domestic coalition's redesign costs are a function of compatibility
with its original technology, R(").  Assume R(") is decreasing and convex in " and R(1)=R'(1)=0,
and that R(")=0 when q0=0.  In words, sticking with the original technology entails no redesign costs,
which increase at an increasing rate with the deviation from the original design, while a completely
new technology – i.e., one for which there are no established customers – entails no redesign costs
no matter the technology choice.  Without loss of generality, we assume the domestic coalition's other
fixed costs have no influence at the margin. For simplicity, we also assume constant marginal cost of
production and, without loss of generality, set this equal to zero.
The domestic coalition solves its multi-stage profit-maximization problem by backward
induction.  In the second stage, the domestic coalition chooses output volume so as to maximize
profit, given consumers' expectations of network size and its prior compatibility decision, ".
Max A(q*",$) = q (A+v(Ne)- (q + q*)) - R(")      (11)
    q
The foreign coalition's objective is likewise to maximize profits given " and consumers' expectations
by
Max A*(q**",$) = q* (A+v(Ne*) - (q + q*))      (12)
      q*
Assume a fulfilled expectations Cournot equilibrium in which consumers' expectations about the sizes
of the two domestic market product networks are fulfilled in equilibrium, i.e., (Ne,Ne*) = (N, N*) and11 Katz and Shapiro (1985) also demonstrate another case, in which consumers form
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(16)
(qe, qe*) = (q,q*).








()&(q%2q() ’ 0 (14)
These two equations represent the reaction curves of the two competing coalitions and can be solved
implicitly for the subgame perfect equilibrium quantities, (q   8("),q   8*(")), conditional on the optimal first
period compatibility choice of ".
Let us now consider the comparative static effects of the domestic coalition's first period
choice of " on (q   8("),q   8*(")). Differentiating (13) and (14) with respect to " gives the system of
equations
Appropriate differentiation and algebra then establishes that
We will need this expression to solve the coalition's optimal (stage one) technology choice, below.
But  in addition to that instrumental value, the result in (16) sheds light on the relationship between14
sales volume and the coalition's prior technology choice.  This relationship can be summarized in two
propositions (proofs of which are in the appendix).
Proposition 1: If and only if there is an installed base in the original domestic technology, then  the
domestic coalition’s sales are increasing in the degree of its product's compatibility
with the original domestic technology, i.e., by deviating from the international
product standard if it is not identical to the original domestic technology. 
Proposition 1 tells us that when there exists a set of established consumers of the original
technology, the coalition’s profit-maximizing sales quantity will be greater if it has chosen a new
technology positioned between the international standard and the original domestic technology than
if its new technology conforms perfectly to the international standard.  Because prospective
consumers value compatibility, the coalition’s market share is greater when it occupies a central
location on the continuum of existing technologies ($,1), analogous to the Hotelling (1929) result.
For immature networks, wherein new sales generate marginal network effects (v'>0), the first
term in the numerator of (16) is of indeterminant sign when "￿$, so we have only the local result
offered in proposition one.  However, for mature networks, wherein the marginal value of adding
participants vanishes, we can derive somewhat more general results.
Proposition 2: When the installed bases for both the original and international standard
technologies are large, then sales of the new technology are increasing in ".15
Intuitively, the domestic coalition can increase its sales and profits by increasing the degree
of compatibility with a mature technology's network.   When both the international standard and the
original domestic networks are mature, however, sales are maximized by maintaining the original
domestic technology (i.e., at " =1) because this minimizes coalition redesign costs, enabling the
domestic producer to offer a lower price and generate greater sales.  As the existing literature on
switching costs emphasizes (Klemperer 1995), the friction introduced by nonzero technology
switching costs creates lock-in effects.  In the present case, this phenomenon is manifest in the
domestic coalition’s incentive to deviate from an international product standard in the direction of
a preexisting domestic technology.
The first stage compatibility choice of "  reinforces this finding.  Given the second-stage
fulfilled expectations Cournot equilibrium, reflected in the optimal quantities (q   8(" ),q   8*(" )), the
coalition maximizes profit by choosing " so as to
Max A (q   8(" ),q   8*(" )," *$) = q   8(" )(A + v(N) - (q   8(" )+q   8*(" ))) - R(" ) (17)
    " 
The first-order necessary condition for an optimum is thus
q   8 {v'(N)[q0+f'("-$)(q   8*+q0*)]- (Mq   8*/M" ) } - R'(")  # ($) 0 (18)
{with <0 only if " = 0 and >0 only if " = 1}
The first-stage problem thus relates the coalition's technology choice, ", to profits in a fashion
analogous to the relationship between " and the coalition's sales volume, q   8("), derived earlier through
comparative statics analysis of the solution to the coalition's second stage problem.  The necessary
condition for profit maximization in (18) permits us to derive the necessary conditions for the
domestic coalition to choose the international standard voluntarily.16
Proposition 3: The domestic coalition voluntarily produces a good perfectly compatible with the
international standard (8 "=$) only if the international standard is itself perfectly
compatible with the domestic original-technology or there was no preexisting
domestic technology ($=1).  Otherwise it chooses a technology more compatible with
the original domestic technology than is the international standard (8 ">$).
Again, the proof is in the appendix.  The intuition of this proposition runs as follows.
Although there may be multiple subgame perfect equilibria since there will not necessarily be a unique
profit-maximizing combination (" 8, q 8), two effects each cause the domestic producer to deviate from
the international product standard unless it is perfectly compatible with the original domestic
technology or no such original technology existed.  First, positioning the new technology between
the old domestic technology and the international standard can increase the consumer’s expected
network size, thereby securing a higher equilibrium price attributable to the technology’s superior
compatibility.  Second, the closer the new technology to the old, the lower the redesign costs
incurred.  Both effects cause deviation away from the international standard toward the original
technology.  An established customer base and technology thereby creates a degree of path-
dependence in coalition technology choice.
Technology choice will have trade volume effects since, by Proposition 1, the domestic
coalition's equilibrium quantity is increasing in " and the foreign coalition's sales volume is decreasing
in ".  Where an established consumer base confers some advantage on incumbent domestic producers,
international product standardization would then indeed stimulate international trade flows.12 This issue is studied further in section IIc.
17
Coalitions’ rational noncompliance with standards therefore reduces trade volumes relative to the
scenario of full compliance.
12
Proposition 3 implicitly highlights the importance of ex ante versus ex post standardization,
where ex ante standardization represents the designation of an international standard, $, before the
establishment of a competing domestic technology (i.e., q0=0), and under ex post standardization,
$ is set after a domestic technology has been installed (i.e., q0>0).  Coalitions have incentives to
comply with ex ante standards, but not necessarily with ex post standards.  The problem with ex ante
standardization, however, is that if research and development is stochastic, then it is impossible to
know the optimal design ex ante, so widespread compliance may be gained at the price of a
potentially suboptimal standard.  On the other hand, once there is an installed base in a particular
technology, voluntary coalition compliance can only be ensured if the international standard adopted
ex post is the original domestic technology, $=1.  In other words, only ex ante standardization can
work under the conditions imposed in our model.  This obviously bodes poorly for ex post
standardization of technologies developed independently in more than one importing nation, e.g., for
mature products subject to intra-industry trade.  As a rule of thumb, these results suggest that self-
enforcing, technologically desirable international product standards can be achieved only if there is
a clear leader, who develops a technology successfully and before anyone else has developed a
competing standard.  Under such a scenario, international product standards must go hand-in-hand
with intellectual property rights.
We earlier considered the conditions under which the domestic and foreign coalition share the
market.  Having now shown that domestic coalitions will, under fairly general conditions, choose a13 The sufficient condition is simply a strict inequality.
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technology more compatible with the original domestic technology than the international standard
(i.e., " > $), let us return to consider the effect of the preexisting domestic network size, q0, on the
division of the market between the two suppliers.  Recalling the earlier expressions of consumer's
willingness to pay for the new domestic technology and the international standard (relations 3 and
4, respectively), we can now derive conditions under which the domestic coalition will exclude
imports in equilibrium.   
The necessary condition
13 for the domestic coalition to supply the whole market is
[v(N) - v(N*)] + [p*-p] $ 0      (19)
In words, the price differential between the products using domestic and international standards must
not exceed the sum of the benefits to consumers from a larger network externality.  In long-run
equilibrium under monopolistic competition, price equals average cost, implying p=R(")/q and p*=0
under our assumption of zero and constant marginal costs.  Conditional on the optimal technology
choice, " > $ for $￿1, the lefthand side of (19) is then increasing in the installed base of the original
domestic technology, q0.  In simpler terms,  the more mature the domestic industry, as manifest in a
larger established consumer base for its original technology, the more likely the domestic coalition
can exclude foreign rivals in equilibrium.
Proposition 4: The larger the established base of the original domestic technology, q0 , the larger
the price markup the domestic coalition enjoys relative to the imported international
standard, and the more likely it is to exclude the international standard from the
domestic market in equilibrium.19
The intuition of Proposition 4 runs as follows.  The larger the population of established
consumers of the original domestic technology, the greater the unit value to new consumers of a
technology that is relatively more compatible to established consumer’s technology than is the
international standard.  In equilibrium, the price falls to average fixed cost as new brands are
introduced to increase supply until the domestic coalition fully controls the market. The core point
is that product standardization enables traditional, price-based international competition.  But the
existence of technology redesign costs or network effects creates market frictions that diminish the
incentive to standardize if there already exists a different technology in a reasonalby large market.
This leads to multi-attribute competition between products and will, generally reduce trade flows.
An intriguing prospective extension of this model emerges from the case where there is no
original domestic technology, so a start-up coalition with market power in a network good (i.e., a
coalition given an exclusive concession by the government, but for which q0=0) optimally chooses
the international standard in order to take advantage of the broader international standard network.
The innovation would then be to introduce learning-by-doing dynamics which could lead to the new
coalition acquiring comparative advantage in this product.  This stylized scenario seems to resemble
many cases in East Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, where active government industrial policy went
hand-in-hand with rapid adoption of foreign technology standards and trade expansion.  Contrast this
experience with that of several Latin American economies in which incumbent industries secured
considerable tariff and regulatory protection against foreign technologies.  Extensions of the present





































C. Competing for Third Markets
One can also think of this model in a slightly different way, in which two distinct coalitions
have independently captured their home markets, q0 and q0*, and are competing for the rest of the
world market.  In this scenario, our model can be reinterpreted to consider how home market size
affects technology choice in the competition for third-country export markets in the presence of
international standards.  In particular, maintaining the assumption that the two standards coalitions
are Cournot competitors for the third-country export market, the first-order condition for profit-
maximizing technology choice, (18), yields the following comparative statics relationships via the
implicit function theorem:
These expressions lead to a fifth, intuitive propostion, proof of which is in the Appendix.
Proposition 5: If the international standard is not the original domestic technology standard, then
so long as the market is not fully mature, the larger the established market in the
international standard technology, the less the optimal deviation of the coalition’s
new technology from the international standard.  14 While the effect on optimal technology choice of the international standard’s installed
base is unambiguous, the effect of the installed base of the original domestic technology, by
contrast, turns on an unintuitive comparison between the slope and (scaled) curvature of the
network externality function.  Details are reported in the Appendix under the proof of Proposition
5. 
15 The government obviously has a laissez faire option which demands no analysis.
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As with earlier propositions, a large but not-yet-mature existing market induces increased
compatability by the new technology because firms wish to take advantage of consumers’ preference
for access to a larger network in the international product standard.
14  Once the network is mature,
however, the marginal value of increased compatibility goes to zero, so this effect exists only over
a limited range.  When the new international standard’s established market is large, the optimal
technology choice therefore approaches $, meaning that the optimal deviation from the international
standard is weakly decreasing in the size of the established market for the international technology
standard.  Optimal deviations will be less from international standards that have well established
markets than from those that are not yet well established.
III.  Government Incentives: International Standards Or Regulatory Barriers To Trade?
The preceding model generates clear predictions regarding the incentives faced by the
domestic coalition not to comply with the international product standard voluntarily.  But a powerful
government might be able to compel the coalition's compliance by regulatory fiat.  Alternatively, an
interventionist government might constrain the coalition's ability to modify the original technology
by imposing regulatory product standards different from the international standard, in particular, the
original technology.
15  A government that seeks to maximize consumer welfare would need to
consider both the consumer surplus of new consumers who enter the market and any induced change16 Given that firm profits equal zero in monopolistic competitive equilibrium, consumer








in the consumer surplus enjoyed by the established consumers who own the original technology but
do not purchase the new technology.
16  The previous section explored the effects of the coalition’s
choice of technology, ", on firm incentives. Now we explore how a desire to maximize aggregate
consumer surplus might influence the government’s incentive to influence the coalition’s technology
choice.
The economic surplus enjoyed by a consumer joining a network depends on the network size
and price, both of which are affected by the coalition’s technology choice.  By equation (7), a  new
consumer whose intrinsic valuation of the product, r, is greater than the hedonic price, N, joins the
network and derives a surplus of r + q + q* -A from joining a network with sales of Q=q+q*.
Integrating over the A-Q consumers who enter the market yields aggregate new consumers' surplus
This is the first part of the consumer surplus about which the government is concerned.
The cohort of established consumers is the other group about which the government is
concerned.  Technology choice can affect established consumers in either of two ways.  First, by
changing the size of the network, it changes their valuation of the product they already own,
bestowing gross welfare benefits on them for free.  Second, a change in the network product
technology may impose gross switching costs on established consumers.  For example, not only
would a population of consumers owning metric-sized mechanical equipment not derive network
externality benefits from industry adoption of a completely incompatible English-sized parts17 Some of us who purchased laptop computers in the early 1990s when they were only
manually-switchable between voltage regimes learned the hazards of partial compatibility the hard
way.  A jet-lagged traveller incurred large “failure to switch” costs if he plugged in a unit
prematurely.
18 Klemperer (1995) offers an excellent survey of the microeconomic literature on
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technology standard ("=$=0), they would suffer costs due to the added inconvenience of finding
correct parts and tools.  Similarly, owners of electronic equipment suddenly may have to check
voltage compatibility when an alternative technology is introduced with different standards.
17 
The welfare effects of the technology choice on the subpopulation of q0 established consumers
can therefore be represented as
Se = q0 [v(N) - v(q0+$q0*) - SC(")]      (23)
where the difference between the first and second bracketed terms represents the increase in an
established consumer’s network externality benefits and the third term captures the gross switching
costs incurred.  SC(") is assumed to be nonegative, with SC'<0 and SC(1)=SC'(1)=0.  In words,
established consumers' switching costs decrease with the degree of compatibility of the new
technology with the original domestic technology they own, going to zero when the technology does
not change.
18  
Aggregate consumer surplus in the economy is the sum of these two components, S=Sn+Se.
In order to see whether the government is inclined to support the international product standard, we
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Unless there is no installed base in the original domestic technology (q0=0) – in which case consumer
surplus is invariant with respect to " around the firm optimum of "=$=1 – then consumer surplus is
increasing in " when evaluated in the neighborhood of "=$ because the network externality function,
v(N) is monotonically increasing in N, and because switching costs and redesign costs (and therefore
equilibrium price) are monotonically decreasing in ".  A government concerned about consumer
welfare will therefore have an interest in maintaining compatibility with the original domestic
technology quite apart from the incentives faced by private producers.  This yields Proposition 6.
Proposition 6: A government concerned exclusively about the welfare of domestic parties will not
require compliance with the international product standard if there is already an
established base of consumers of the original domestic technology.
One final important finding emerges in the case where the product network is mature, so the
marginal network externality benefit equals zero for either new or established consumers.  In this
case, when v’(œ)=0,
In the case of mature network technologies – e.g., right or left-hand-side drive vehicles, voltage
standards in power grids, color television broadcasting specifications – because consumers have to
pay for technological change, both directly through covering firms’ redesign costs and indirectly
through switching costs, consumer welfare is best served by strict compliance with the old
technology.  A consumer-minded government therefore has a strong incentive to impose regulatory25
barriers, including trade barriers, to ensure compliance with the old domestic technology standard.
Hence our next proposition .
Proposition 7: In the case of mature network products, government maximizes consumer
surplus if it enforces compliance with the old domestic technology rather
than permitting firms to alter the technology to increase compatibility with
a different international standard. 
Propositions 6 and 7 are robust to most redefinitions of the means by which government
determines policy since any political economy model based on votes or contributions that depend on
domestic groups’ welfare will generate an optimal policy choice of ">$ unless $=1.  An
interventionist government will not compel compliance with the international product standard.
Gandal and Shy (1996) study governement choice with respect to the recognition of foreign standards
and find the desirability of recognition is inversely related to the conversion costs a coalition must
incur to comply with a foreign standard, akin to our redesign costs, R(").  This paper shows similar
results emerge from the consumer side: greater switching costs and lower additional network
externality benefits for established consumers reduce the government's incentive to enforce an
international product standard.  The general inference drawn from both papers is that the greater the
frictions in technology conversion — on either the consumer or producer side — the less likely is a
government to recognize foreign product standards. This broad principle applies to a variety of
standards, potentially including metric versus nonmetric measures, sanitary and phytosanitary
standards on agricultural commodities, voltage and other electronics standards, etc.  Indeed, a19 Such regulatory barriers may cause foreign coalitions to incur extra conversion, testing
or certification costs in order to meet the differential standard, thus having an effect equivalent to
a specific tariff.  An unusual characteristic of this quasi-protectionism is that, as the present model
shows, it might be desired by consumers more than by producers.
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consumer-oriented or social welfare maximizing government would more likely consider introducing
regulatory barriers to trade in an effort to resolve the private technology choice externality evident
in relations (24) and (25).
19  This analytical result appears consistent with the casual observation that
regulatory barriers to trade invariably arise from pressure by import-competing coalitions, consumer
groups, or both (Hillman 1991, Thilmany and Barrett 1997).
Together, Propositions 3-7 raise serious questions about the international standards-setting
process. Incumbent producers have little incentive to comply with an international product standard
that deviates from their current technology, indeed they may be able to exclude foreign competitors
from their home market by deviating.  Meanwhile, a host nation government has no incentive to force
the coalition to comply with the international standard.  Indeed, it may even wish to restrict the
coalition's ability to approach the international standard and, especially in the case of a mature
technology, to compel compliance with the original technology.  A government from a country that
imports network products can thus credibly insist that prospective foreign suppliers conform to the
preexisting domestic technology standard, else it will refuse to use regulatory powers to enforce the
international product standard and might even, in the interests of consumer welfare, obstruct entry
of the international standard.  While there is only one importing country in our model, the suggestion
is clear that if multiple standards exist, stalemates over ex post standardization and reciprocal
regulatory barriers to trade would be likely.  This seems consistent with experience to date. 27
IV. Conclusions
There is widespread belief that harmonized international product standards promote trade and
economic welfare globally.  Considerable government and corporate human and financial resources
are thus committed to the process of negotiating and enforcing international standards.  However,
the diversity of original technologies among potential trading coalitions and countries makes
standards-setting a difficult process.  
The simple model presented in this paper suggests that establishing an international standard
that governments and private coalitions or firms  will honor may be formidable for an important class
of goods, those characterized by network externalities —  for which compatibility is central to market
performance — technology redesign costs, or consumer switching costs.  First, if an importing
country already has a significant network size under its original domestic technology, the domestic
producer has an incentive to deviate from any international product standard that is not fully
compatible with its own original technology.  This clearly suggests a problem of path-dependence or
lock-in effects, whereby a technology persists whether or not it is technically superior to other
available technologies.  Second, the consumer welfare maximizing government of an importing
country has no incentive to force its producers to comply with the international standard.  Indeed, the
coalition's profit maximizing choice to deviate from the international product standard in the direction
of the original domestic technology generates additional domestic consumer surplus because it
reduces established consumers' switching costs and increases their added network externality benefits.
Knowing this, governments from economies not possessing comparative advantage in a product (i.e.,
prospective importers) have incentives to credibly resist product standardization, thereby potentially28
frustrating multilateral efforts to negotiate technologically superior standards. Moreover,
heterogeneity in standards gives rise to technical barriers to trade.  
Our generally pessimistic conclusions about the prospects for global harmonization in network
product standards should nonetheless be interpreted cautiously.  Ours is a parsimonious model that
does not include the dynamic evolution of international standards, uncertainty about  emerging
technologies, strategic interaction among the parties negotiating standards, or the potential for market
power exercised by exporting coalitions.  The rapidly advancing literature on networks suggests
uncertainty and strategic interaction can be of considerable importance. It would also be fruitful to
establish explicitly exporting coalitions' and governments' incentives to adopt international product
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Proof of Proposition 1
When evaluated around the point "=$,  f'("!$) = 0, and thus equation (16) becomes
= 
 2/3[v'(N)q0 - R'(")] > 0          (A1) Mq/M"
But since R'(")= 0 only when q0=0 or "=1, then  *"=$￿1 =0 if and only if q0 = 0. Mq/M"
Proof of Proposition 2
When  v'(œ)=v'(œ*)=0, equation (16) reduces to
which is positive for all " <1.
Proof of Proposition 3
There are two parts to the proof of this proposition.  
(a) If q0=0 and q   8>0, then the left-hand side of (18) reduces to q   8 [ v'(N) f'(8 "-$) (q   8*+q0*)] - Mq   8*/M",
for which the optimum obtains if and only if 8 "=$=1. 
[Note, (i) if q0=0, then v'(N)>0, and (ii) the logic of Proposition 1 can be repeated to derive
Mq   8*/M"<0.]  
(b) If not q0=0, then when equation (18) is evaluated around "=$, it becomes
       (A3) MA
M"
*"’$ ’ q v )(N)(q0)& Mˆ q (
M"
&R )(") > 032
Hence the necessity of $=1 for 8 "=$.  
Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 cannot be proved generally without imposing considerable, arbitrary structure on f(.)
and v(.), but we can prove that it holds for both infant and mature technologies. Given that we are
relying on a sequence of sufficient conditions, the unproven suggestion is that the relation holds more
generally. Call the lefthand side of (19) 7.  Assume long-run equilibrium under monopolistic
competition, i.e., p*-p = -R(")/q. Then partial differentiation of 7  with respect to q0 yields:
M7/Mq0 = (" - $) + R(")/q
2 @ Mq/Mq0
Since the term in parentheses is positive given the optimal technology choice (">$) and R(")/q
2$0,
a sufficient condition for M7/Mq0 > 0 is
Mq/Mq0 $ 0
Comparative static analysis of (13) and (14) reveals that
Mq/Mq0 = [2v'(N)" - v'(N*)$]/3
Without imposing specific functional forms on f() and v(.), this expression cannot be signed
unambiguously.  But the sufficient condition is satisfied at either end of the continuum relevant to
v(.), i.e., for large or small q0 . For large q0, or more precisely Mq/Mq0*q0=œ/$ = 0, since both v'(N) and
v'(N*)60.  For small q0, Mq/Mq0*q0=0 $0 if q< q* + q0*.  This can be seen by rearranging the righthand
side above so that the sufficient condition is v'(N)/v'(N*)$ $/(2"), for which a sufficient condition
is that N<N*.  Using (1) and (2), with q0=0, we find that q< q* + q0* is a sufficient condition, i.e.,
if the installed base in the international standard technology is relatively large.
Proof of Proposition 5
The denominator is negative for both (20) and (21), regardless of network size. For a mature
network, M"/Mq0 = M"/Mq*0 = 0 since v'(N*) = v''(N*) = 0.  So network size only matters in immature
networks in which network size affects consumers’ marginal valuation of the new product.  For an
immature network, and since we have already established that ">$ for any $￿1, we restrict analysis
to the only interesting region, when  ">$.  Then, the numerator of (21) is always positive, so M"/Mq*0
< 0.  The divergence of the new technology from the international standard is therefore (weakly)
decreasing in the size of the installed base under the international standard.  
No such unambiguous relation exists between " and q0. The numerator of (20) is positive if and only
if v'(N) > | v''(N)[(q0 + f'("-$)(q*+q0*)]
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